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Abstract 
The need for Australians to increase retirement savings has been widely 
promoted. Yet, our understanding of the motivations of individuals to save 
at a higher rate remains sparse. This paper reports the findings of a survey of 
superannuation fund members and their motivations to contribute more to 
superannuation and to manage their investment strategy. The paper uses the 
theory of planned behaviour to focus on the important motivational 
influence of social norms. The study finds that spouses appear to be the 
primary source of social influence for retirement savings decisions. The 
government and employers appear to exert little influence, and financial 
advisors and superannuation funds take up the middle ground of social 
influence. Possibilities for interventions designed to influence behaviour are 
discussed and opportunities for further study are proposed. 
Keywords: retirement savings, social norms, superannuation, 
investment choice. 
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Normative influence on retirement savings decisions: Do people care what employers 
and the government want? 
One of the most pressing economic issues to face Australian society over 
coming decades is how retirement incomes will be funded for an increasing 
proportion of retirees. It is estimated that by 2050 there will be 23.5% of the 
Australian population aged 65 and over, compared to 10.7% currently (Australian 
Treasury, 2007). Moreover, the proportion of people aged 65 and over relative to 
people of traditional labour force age, 15 to 64 years, is projected to increase from the 
2002 level of 19% to almost 41% by 2042 (Australian Treasury, 2007). These 
statistics are not peculiar to Australia as a similar demographic shift is forecast for 
many other developed countries. One example of the economic impact of the ageing 
population is that the cost of the age pension as a proportion of GDP is expected to 
increase from 2.9% in 2002 to 4.4% by 2046-47(Australian Treasury, 2002, 2007). 
The global financial crisis will potentially increase this proportion as anecdotal 
evidence suggests a reported 50% increase in pension applications between October 
and December 2008 alone (Macklin, 2009). 
A range of opinions have been expressed on the adequacy of the current level of 
savings for retirement by Australians. IFSA (2006) suggest that a savings gap of $452 
billion exists, meaning that “current superannuation still falls well short of the 
benchmark needed to fund adequate living standards in retirement” (IFSA, 2006, p.5). 
More comprehensive analyses by Rothman (2007) have identified improvements in 
retirement savings adequacies which are projected to increase further into the middle 
of the 21st century through a combination of increased superannuation savings, 
savings outside of superannuation, and increased aged pension eligibility through the 
“Better Super” reforms of the Australian government. At an individual level Russell 
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et al. (2006) have also identified successful privately sponsored savings programmes. 
Notwithstanding these improvements it has also been identified that more than three 
million Australians are below targeted retirement savings adequacy levels (Access 
Economics, 2008). 
An obvious approach to improving the quality of life for individuals in 
retirement, and to alleviate the forecast Australian government budget burden, is to 
induce people to save through superannuation. The identified policy responses have 
perhaps understandably focussed on direct “hip-pocket” incentives: eliminating tax on 
superannuation withdrawals after 60 years of age; introducing generous retirement 
transition rules; and gentler taper rates for pension eligibility. Early indications are 
that these have been successful, but more so for those at or near retirement and those 
with higher incomes (Rothman, 2007). However, a good deal more needs to be done 
to motivate people to save more and to invest more efficiently for their retirement 
needs. Yet, much past research regarding the psychological determinants of 
individual’s retirement savings choices can be characterised as disparate in that it fails 
to be couched within any integrative theoretical framework. One outcome of this 
situation is a lack of opportunity to assess the relative importance of various 
determinants of retirement savings behaviour.  
This research project sought to redress the lack of research through a survey of 
2300 superannuation fund members. The primary aim of the research was to identify 
the relative importance of key behavioural determinants and to relate these to 
intervention possibilities applied to the individual, the workplace, and the general 
public. The theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1988) was used for these purposes as 
it has been widely applied in past research and shown to be robust across diverse 
behavioural contexts. The practical objectives of the research centre on identifying 
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intervention opportunities to influence individuals’ behaviour to achieve higher 
retirement savings accumulations. This is achieved by examining the influence of 
social norms on retirement savings decisions and drawing implications for educators, 
policy makers, and professionals as well identifying areas for further research. 
Theory of Planned Behaviour 
Retirement income provision in Australia is predicated on three pillars: (1) the 
age pension; (2) mandatory contributions under the Superannuation Guarantee 
(administration) Act 1992, which currently requires employers contribute a minimum 
of 9% of employee wages to a complying superannuation fund; and (3) voluntary 
savings, primarily through, but not restricted to the tax-preferred superannuation 
system. The focus of the present research is the second and third pillars. Specifically, 
investment choices of superannuation fund members receiving employer contributions 
under the superannuation guarantee, and voluntary saving within the superannuation 
system. Thus, the motivations of individuals to contribute to superannuation beyond 
the mandated employer-level contribution, together with individuals’ motivations to 
manage the manner in which accumulated savings are invested were the two 
behaviours of interest to the research. 
The theory of planned behaviour is predicated on three variables found to 
adequately predict the intention to perform a given behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
2000). These variables are one’s attitude towards the behaviour, one’s perception of 
social pressure as a consequence of the views and actions of significant others 
(subjective or social norms) and one’s perceptions of control over performance of the 
behaviour (perceived behavioural control). Measurement of these constructs is 
performed directly, according to multi-item scales, and indirectly, according to 
expectancy-value formulations of underlying behavioural (attitudinal), normative and 
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control beliefs. Intention and perceived behavioural control together predict actual 
performance of the behaviour in question.  
The theory of planned behaviour has explained, on average across various 
contexts, 39% of the variance in intention and 27% of the variance in behaviour 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 2000). Substantial bodies of theory and research support the 
construct validity and predictive validity of the theory of planned behaviour (for a 
review see Connor & Armitage, 1998; Sheeran, 2002; and Connor & Sparks, 2005). 
The theory of planned behaviour was expected to effectively predict intention 
and behaviour in the present retirement savings context. However, the theory does not 
presume that any of its predictors will necessarily have primacy in terms of predictive 
importance. Rather, relative predictive importance will depend upon the specific 
behaviour and the behavioural context under investigation. The relative importance of 
predictor variables in, for example, the health behaviour or travel domains may be 
expected to differ to that in the retirement savings domain because each domain is 
characterised by substantively different attitudinal, normative and control factor 
considerations.  
Social Norms 
Although the present research made no prediction concerning the relative 
predictive importance of antecedent variables, the subjective (social) norm variable 
was expected to prove influential. The literature on the influence of normative factors 
(e.g., “if others are doing it or recommending it, perhaps I should do it too”) is 
limited. However, Duflo and Saez (2003) provided some expectation that normative 
factors might be influential in retirement savings behaviour prediction. Duflo and 
Saez randomly selected participants who were offered a cash incentive to attend a 
benefits information fair. Duflo and Saez found that those who attended the fair were 
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significantly more likely to enrol in the savings program. However, they also found 
savings choices of individuals who did not attend the fair to mirror the savings 
choices of their fair-attending peers. Duflo and Saez argued that these findings 
suggested that relatively minor factors (peer effects) that do not directly affect the 
financial attractiveness of saving can have a significant impact on the formulation of 
saving plans. 
Bailey, Nofsinger and O’Neill (2004) explored the role of social norm effects on 
retirement savings decisions in a US experimental setting. Social norms were found to 
have direct effects on contribution amounts. Bailey et al. (2004) suggest the results 
were important because, upon first being hired, a new employee will typically be 
asked to make decisions about participation and contribution levels. In an Australian 
context, as a consequence of the choice of fund legislation1
The studies of Duflo and Saez (2003) and Bailey et al. (2004) were performed 
in a US context. Employees in Australia are typically not asked about participation in 
voluntary contribution schemes (Fielding, 2007). This tendency in Australia prevails, 
potentially because a mandated contribution scheme already exists and further 
voluntary schemes carry an administrative cost burden. Yet, for reasons discussed 
above, there remains a need for many individuals in Australia to save more for their 
retirement. Thus wider voluntary contributions scheme application and uptake 
remains an important endeavor in an Australian context.  
 effective since July 2005, 
a majority of employees are additionally asked, within the first 28 days of 
employment, which fund they would like their contributions to be paid to. 
Method 
Research Design 
                                                 
1 Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Act 2004 
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The research followed the recommendations of Ajzen (2002) with a 
questionnaire designed to elicit self-reported responses to questions needed for 
measurement of the intention, attitude, social norms and perceived behavioural 
control of the two behaviours: contributing extra to superannuation within the next 
12-months; and changing the investment strategy of superannuation contributions 
within the next 12-months. Subsequent examination of superannuation fund records 
will enable the assessment of correspondence between participant’s intention to 
perform the behaviours of interest and actual performance of the behaviours. This will 
be the focus of future work. The analysis reported here is confined to the causal path 
from the theory of planned behaviour’s predictor variables (attitude, subjective norm 
and perceived behavioural control) to the Intention variable. 
Participants 
Participants were randomly selected from four Australian superannuation fund 
member databases. Of a total of 20,000 questionnaires distributed by mail in 2006 
(5,000 for each fund), 2,339 (12%) questionnaires were returned. It was estimated that 
the 67 questions plus demographic data would take 30 minutes for participants to 
complete and return. The modest response rate was hence anticipated but raised the 
possibility of bias in the data (Moser & Kalton, 1972). It is not possible to compare 
the demographic characteristics of survey respondents with those of non-respondents 
because the funds did not supply demographic details of non-respondents. However, 
the population of interest was the Australia working population. Inspection of labour 
force survey information reveals that average worker-age is 39 years, males comprise 
54% of the work force and average worker annual earnings are $43654 (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2006a). Table 1 displays summary demographic characteristics 
of the questionnaire sample. Females were over represented in the sample relative to 
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the overall Australian population, though it is reflective of the overall fund 
membership profile of the four funds. The middle-aged were similarly over 
represented and average participant income was slightly lower than the population 
average. The opportunity to perform gender and age-based analyses of the data 
alleviated some concerns about over/under representation of these demographic 
groupings. Nevertheless, the generalisability of some aspects of results remains 
subject to qualification. 
<Insert Table 1> 
Table 2 presents the range and proportion of occupation in the participant 
sample. When compared to the Australian population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2006b) the most notable differences in the sample were the over-representation of 
professionals and under-representation of Technicians, Sales Workers, and Labourers. 
To the extent that the data were not analysed for inter-group differences relating to 
these demographics, the results are subject to qualification. 
<Insert Table 2> 
Measures 
The recommendations of Ajzen (2002) were followed in questionnaire design. 
Several items served as indicators of the latent variables (attitude, subjective norm 
and perceived behavioural control) modeled to predict the latent Intention variable. 
Both direct and indirect measures were used to measure attitude, subjective norm and 
perceived behavioural control, as discussed below. 
Direct measures. The direct measure of the attitude toward the two target 
behaviours was assessed by means of five 7-point unipolar evaluative semantic 
differential scales (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957). The anchors of these scales, 
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modeled after Ajzen (2002), were: harmful-beneficial, unpleasant-pleasant, bad-
good, worthless-valuable, unenjoyable-enjoyable and wrong-right.  
With respect to the direct measure of subjective or social norm, respondents 
were asked to indicate on 7-point unipolar scales the extent to which they believe that 
most people who are important to them, or whose opinion they value, think that: they 
should not-should perform the target behaviours; would expect them to perform the 
behaviours (extremely unlikely-extremely likely); would disapprove-approve of them 
performing the behaviours; would-would not perform the behaviours themselves; and 
intend to perform the behaviours themselves (completely false-completely true).  
Finally, four items modeled after Ajzen’s (2002) method directly assessed 
perceived control over the target behaviours. Again using 7-point unipolar scales, 
respondents were asked whether performance of the two behaviours would be 
impossible-possible, whether, if the respondent wanted to, he or she could perform the 
behaviour (definitely false-definitely true), the respondent’s perception of the degree 
of control possessed over performing the behaviour (no control-complete control), 
and whether performance of the behaviour was mostly up to the respondent (strongly 
disagree-strongly agree). 
Indirect Measures. Accessible beliefs are assumed to provide the cognitive and 
affective foundations for attitudes, subjective norms, and perceptions of behavioural 
control (Ajzen, 2002). If this assumption is correct, then beliefs can be relied upon to 
obtain indirect, belief-based measures of these constructs. Accessible behavioural 
beliefs are assumed to account for attitude toward the behaviour, accessible normative 
beliefs for subjective norm, and accessible control beliefs for perceived behavioural 
control. 
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Prior to the main survey, a formative survey was conducted with an independent 
sample (n=49) to elicit modal behavioural, normative and control beliefs (modal 
beliefs being those beliefs most commonly held in the population). Five behavioural 
beliefs were elicited in the formative research for each of the two behaviours of 
interest. For contributing extra to superannuation the five modal beliefs were: “to 
boost my retirement savings”; “to be able to improve my standard of living in 
retirement”; “to be able to gain taxation benefits”; “having my savings tied up for a 
long time”; and “having my current spending needs affected”. Similar, but 
substantively different modal beliefs were elicited for investment allocation 
behaviour: “to be able to achieve higher growth in my retirement savings”; “to 
achieve a better matching of my risk and return preferences”; “to be able to take 
advantage of market opportunities”; “to be able to achieve more personal ownership 
in investment performance”; and “to incur additional costs and management fees”. 
Two questions were asked in the main survey to provide an indirect measure of 
attitude to the two target behaviours using the modal behavioral beliefs. First, 
participants were asked to evaluate each outcome (for example “For me, to boost my 
retirement savings is …”) on a 7-point good-bad scale. Second, to assess belief 
strength, they were asked to rate the likelihood that performance of the target 
behaviour would produce each of the outcomes on a 7-point unlikely-likely scale. For 
example, participants rated how likely it was that “contributing extra to 
superannuation in the next 12 months will enable me to boost my retirement savings.” 
Belief strength and outcome evaluation served to compute an indirect measure of 
attitude toward the behaviour in accordance with an expectancy–value model 
calculated as A = ∑biei (where A = Attitude; bi = belief strength for modal belief i and 
ei = outcome evaluation of modal belief i). Hence each belief strength score is 
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multiplied by its associated outcome evaluation score, and the resulting products are 
summed over all behavioural beliefs to produce an indirect measure of the attitude 
construct.  
The formative survey revealed five referent groups, common to both behaviours 
of interest: spouse/partner; financial advisor; employer; government; and 
superannuation fund. For each of these five identified referent groups, 7-point 
unipolar scales assessed normative belief strength and motivation to comply. For 
example, the statement “My employer thinks that I should make extra superannuation 
contributions in the next 12 months” was rated on a 7-point scale (unlikely-likely) to 
produce a measure of normative belief strength. Similarly to assess the motivation to 
comply, respondents rated on 7-point scales the extent to which they care (not at all or 
very much) about what each referent would want them to do about their 
superannuation arrangements. A measure, comprising normative belief strength and 
motivation to comply with respect to each normative belief (referent), offers a “snap 
shot” of perceived normative pressures in a given population (Ajzen, 2002). An 
overall indirect measure of subjective norm can be obtained by applying the 
expectancy–value model calculated as SN = ∑nimi (where SN = Subjective Norm; ni = 
normative belief strength i; and mi = motivation to comply i). Thus, to produce a 
belief-based estimate of subjective norm, belief strength scores were multiplied by 
motivation to comply scores and the resulting products were summed across all 
normative beliefs. 
Five beliefs that might interfere with (or promote) performance of each of the 
targeted behaviours were identified in the formative study: “Not having an increase in 
my/our income”; “The amount of my/our mortgage and other debts”; “Me/us having 
high living expenses”; “The complexity of required procedures”; and “Not having 
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improved government incentives (e.g., tax benefits)”. Two questions were asked with 
respect to each control belief. One question measured the factor’s likelihood (strength 
of control belief, for example, “I presently have considerable mortgage and other debt 
commitments”) on 7-point (true-false or agree-disagree) scales. The second question 
addressed the extent to which the factor’s presence would further or hinder 
performance of the target behaviours (belief power), and responses were measured on 
7-point much more difficult-not at all more difficult scales. Using an expectancy–
value formulation a belief-based measure of perceived behavioural control calculated 
as PBC = ∑cipi (where PBC = Perceived Behavioural Control; ci = control belief 
strength i and pi = power of control belief i). Prior to analysis, control belief strength 
scores, and other belief-based scores where relevant, were reversed so that positive 
responses were indicated by high scores on the 7-point scales. 
Procedure 
The survey questionnaire was designed to minimise participant response 
ordering effects and participant fatigue effects. Fatigue effects were considered likely 
given the length of the questionnaire. Different items assessing a given construct were 
separated and presented in a non-systematic order, interspersed with items for the 
other constructs. Additionally, the sequence of questions was rotated by dividing the 
questions into four equal sets and rotating these questionnaire segments across 
participants. Moreover, care was taken in the questionnaire to counterbalance high 
and low endpoints of scales in order to counteract possible response sets. 
Theory of planned behaviour questionnaires have been employed by many 
previous studies across diverse contexts, and questionnaire design tends to closely 
follow Ajzen’s (2002) recommended format. The survey was distributed by the four 
superannuation funds with a covering letter of support from the fund. Before 
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processing, questionnaire responses were checked for completeness and data were 
entered into spreadsheets, which were, in turn, checked for accuracy of data entry. 
Prior to data analysis, scale counterbalancing was reversed so that high-score 
endpoints reflected positive intentions in all cases. 
Results 
Results for all direct and indirect measures are presented in this section. The 
subjective norm variable proved the most influential predictor of intention in the 
present, retirement savings, context. Following a summary of the relative importance 
of attitude and perceived behavioural control, the remainder of this section elaborates 
findings concerning normative influence on intentions. 
Relative Predictive Importance of Behavioural Antecedents 
Tables 3 and 4 present means for direct measures of the four key theory of 
planned behaviour variables and correlations among these variables. Scores could 
range from 1 to 7, with scale high-points representing favourable evaluations in all 
scales. It can be seen from Table 3 that respondents had, on average, favourable 
attitudes toward contributing extra to superannuation within the subsequent 12-month 
period, they perceived moderate social pressures to do so, they had high confidence 
they could achieve their behavioural goals if they were to be pursued, and they were 
somewhat ambivalent in their intention to try. 
<Insert Table 3> 
By contrast, Table 4 shows that, compared to making extra contributions, 
participants were less positive in their attitude toward changing their superannuation 
investment strategy within the subsequent 12 month period. This difference between 
mean scores for each behaviour was significantly different.2
                                                 
2 Significance at 99 percent confidence level unless otherwise noted 
 Compared to making 
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extra contributions, respondents perceived social pressures as significantly lower to 
make a change in investment strategy, but they had greater confidence they could 
achieve their behavioural goals if they were to be pursued. However, compared to 
making extra contributions, participants were significantly more ambivalent in their 
intention to try to change investment strategy. 
<Insert Table 4> 
In sum, respondents believed, for both behaviours, that they possessed high 
control over performance of the behaviours. Their attitudes toward performance of the 
behaviours were moderately favourable, but, on average, they were ambivalent in 
their cognitions concerning social pressure to perform the behaviours. Despite these 
moderate to high motivational underpinnings, participants were, on average, 
ambivalent in their intentions to try to perform the behaviours. However, they were 
more inclined to try to contribute extra to superannuation rather than to change their 
superannuation investment strategy. 
Predictive Significance 
The explanatory power for both behaviours of interest compared quite 
favourably to previous theory of planned behaviour studies that typically account for 
39% of the variance in intention and 27% of the variance in behaviour (Armitage and 
Connor, 2001). Table 5 presents results of a regression of Intention on Attitude, 
Subjective Norm and Perceived Behavioural Control. R-squared values of the 
regression for the intention to contribute to extra to superannuation of 0.76 and 0.72 
for changing superannuation investment strategy compare favourably to previous 
applications of the theory. The results confirm that the theory of planned behaviour 
predicts the intention to perform both behaviours of interest very well. The most 
important predictor of intention for both behaviours of interest was subjective norm. 
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Table 5 indicates that this was particularly so for change to superannuation investment 
strategy, where the influence of control factors was greatly subordinate to subjective 
norm and, to a lesser degree, to attitude. For extra contributions behaviour, perceived 
behavioural control was marginally subordinate to the influence of subjective norm, 
but the influence of perceived behavioural control was far greater when compared to 
its influence on the intention to change superannuation investment strategy. Attitude 
ranked third in importance among the three predictors of the intention to make extra 
contributions to superannuation. 
<Insert Table 5> 
Normative Influence 
As discussed, the subjective norm variable was found to be the most influential 
predictor of the intention to perform both behaviours of interest. This section 
examines subjective norms more closely using both the direct and indirect measures. 
It was noted previously that, based on mean scores for the direct measures of 
subjective norm, respondents generally felt moderately positive to neutral social 
pressure to perform the target behaviours (see Tables 1 and 2) and social pressure was 
strongly correlated with respondent’s intention. The indirect composite belief-based 
measure of subjective norm was moderately correlated with the direct measure of 
subjective norm (r = 0.35 for contributing extra to superannuation and r = 0.39 for 
change to superannuation investment strategy). Inspection of the correlation between 
normative belief-based measures and intention in Tables 6 and 7 reveals that, for extra 
superannuation contributions, social pressure was most strongly associated with the 
individual’s spouse or partner, as well as the individual’s financial advisor. According 
to mean scores, participants viewed the wishes of financial advisors more strongly 
than spouses/partners but participants were less motivated to comply with financial 
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advisors than they were with spouses/partners. This same relationship between belief 
strength and motivation to comply was also true for change to superannuation 
investment strategy. Overall, the influence on intention of spouse/partner was stronger 
than that of financial advisor for both behaviours of interest. 
<Insert Table 6 and 7> 
Table 6 indicates that participants held quite strong beliefs about the wishes of 
government and, to a lesser extent, the wishes of their superannuation fund for 
making extra contributions to superannuation. However, participants did not appear at 
all willing to comply with the wishes of either the government or their superannuation 
fund. Among all social referents, participants rated lowest the wishes of employers in 
terms of both belief strength and motivation to comply. Accordingly, belief-based 
measures of subjective norm for employers, together with the government, correlated 
lowest with intention to contribute extra to superannuation. Table 7 indicates that, for 
making changes to superannuation investment strategy, belief strength scores for all 
referents were comparatively lower than equivalent scores for contributing extra to 
superannuation. However, because a generic scale for motivation to comply was used 
for both behaviours, mean scores were the same for both behaviours of interest. 
Among the referent expectancy-value multiplicative measures for making changes to 
superannuation investment strategy, correlations of employer and government with 
intention were lowest. The employer in particular, was a referent group that 
participants believed was hardly interested in their superannuation strategy change 
aspirations. 
Discussion 
Intervention Possibilities 
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The survey results provide clear policy implications, with particular regard to 
increasing Australians’ superannuation contributions beyond the mandated nine 
percent of the Superannuation Guarantee.  When using the theory of planned 
behaviour to explore intervention possibilities it is important to consider both the 
mean level of an independent variable together with its importance as described by its 
regression coefficient. If average scores for a particular independent variable are high 
and its regression coefficient is high, then little may be gained by focusing 
intervention efforts on what is already a strong source of motivation. Alternatively, 
according to Ajzen (2002), if an independent variable’s mean score is low and its 
regression coefficient is high then there is room to move in terms of guiding mean 
scores upward with the objective of consequent increase in the mean levels of the 
dependent variable (intention). The present research found mean scores for the 
subjective norm independent variable to be lowest among the three predictors 
(attitude, subjective norm, perceived behavioural control) of intention and its 
regression coefficient was highest among the predictors. Accordingly, there appears to 
be a very strong case for interventions that illuminate normative behaviour. 
The uncoupling of referent scores into their separate expectancy (belief 
strength) and evaluation (motivation to comply) components provides further 
information about intervention possibilities. Participants believed most strongly that 
the government was keen to see them contributing extra to superannuation. 
Respondents have got the government’s message. However respondents were hardly 
inclined to comply with the wishes of the government. Similarly respondents believed 
that their superannuation fund and financial advisor had an interest in them making 
extra contributions. However respondents were more motivated to comply with their 
financial advisor than their superannuation fund.  
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The data reveal that there is room for positive change in the influence of 
superannuation funds and financial advisors. Determining the means by which change 
might be achieved was beyond the scope of the research, but is a recommended focus 
of future research. Some preliminary suggestions emerged from the formative study. 
An apparent degree of mistrust in the minds of participants concerning perceived 
vested interests of funds and advisors was revealed. That is, some participants 
believed that funds and/or advisors include in their products and services dubious 
claims of performance and are less than fully transparent about fee structure. The 
Federal Government’s declared focus on more readable product disclosure documents 
(Sherry, 2008) is well placed. It is also strongly in the interests of funds themselves to 
be more transparent in seeking to receive increased contribution flows. 
Although participants were inclined to comply with the wishes of their partners, 
participant’s perception that their partners would wish them to contribute extra to 
superannuation was neutral. Neutral perceptions about the wishes of partners may 
point to a need to ensure that, on matters of superannuation, partners are dealt with 
jointly rather than separately by their funds and advisors. Finally, participants 
believed that employers had little interest in them contributing extra to superannuation 
and, amongst all referents, participants were least inclined to comply with the wishes 
of employers. Thus, another tentative conclusion is that employers are in a position to 
significantly improve employee intentions to contribute extra should employers 
succeed in garnering greater persuasive influence. 
Inspection of normative beliefs for investment strategy change revealed that, as 
might be expected when compared to extra contribution beliefs, respondents were not 
of such strong belief that any of the referent groups would expect them to change their 
superannuation investment strategy. However the pattern of mean belief strength and 
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motivation to comply scores was similar to that which applies to extra superannuation 
contributions. Thus the previous comments concerning intervention possibilities apply 
equally to interventions related to changing superannuation investment strategy. 
However, presently it is not an easy proposition for an individual to obtain regular 
low-cost personal financial-investment guidance. Given the motivational importance 
of face-to-face referents (spouse and financial advisor), printed materials, web-based 
information and other impersonal forms of delivery of information and advice alone 
may not be sufficient to achieve advocated outcomes. 
Future Work 
By mandating employer contributions to superannuation, the Australian 
government has exercised a paternalistic approach to the problem of retirement 
savings. Notwithstanding improvements in aggregate and average superannuation 
savings levels, a large proportion of Australians remains below targeted retirement 
savings adequacy levels. The research in this paper examined the motivational 
antecedents of two key retirement savings behaviours: making extra voluntary 
contributions and changing investment strategy.  
The current research has identified several opportunities for intervention. As 
well as promotional and educational programs that aim to influence beliefs of large 
numbers of individuals in society, there may be much more that can be done. In this 
regard, the agency of stakeholders other than the government appears to be at issue. 
For example, one of the more striking findings of the research was the opportunity for 
employers, with the support of funds and advisors, to more widely promote voluntary 
schemes with respect to both behaviours of interest. The manner in which 
promotional programs that aim to move retirement savings behaviours in the 
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advocated direction are designed and delivered was not the subject of the research but 
in view of the findings remains a matter worthy of further study. 
Social norms represent an important area for interventions designed to influence 
retirement savings behaviour. The present research adds to the findings of Duflo and 
Saez (2003) and Bailey et al. (2004) by assessing the importance of social norms 
relative to other behavioural determinants. The research goes further by attaching 
importance weightings to different referent groups, thereby enabling better focus for 
intervention efforts. 
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Table 1 
Sample demographics 
 
Males (n) 916 (39%) 
Females (n) 1423 (61%) 
Couples : Singles (%)  73 : 21 
Average age (years) 45  
Average annual income $55000  
Average household income $87000  
Average household mortgage $70000  
Average household net wealth $404000  
Average superannuation savings balance $190000  
 
 
Table 2 
Sample occupation classification 
 
 Managers Professional Technicians, 
Trade 
Workers 
Community 
and Personal 
Service 
Workers 
Clerical 
and 
Admin. 
Sales 
Workers 
Machinery 
Operators 
and 
Drivers 
Labourers 
Sample 
(n=2216) 9% 58% 6% 9% 11% 1% 2% 3% 
Census 14% 21% 13% 9% 16% 10% 7% 11% 
Source: (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006b) 
 
 
Table 3 
Attitude, subjective norm and perceived control toward contributing extra to 
superannuation 
 
   Correlation 
Variable Mean SD A SN PBC I 
Attitude (A) 4.84 1.23 -    
Subjective norm (SN) 4.20 1.34 0.59 -   
Perceived behavioural control (PBC) 5.24 1.65 0.38 0.35 -  
Intention (I) 4.10 2.16 0.61 0.62 0.57 - 
Note. Mean scores are based on scales, with possible scores ranging from 1 to 7.  
All correlations were statistically significant p<.01, n = 2283.  
 
 
Table 4 
Attitude, subjective norm and perceived control toward changing investment strategy 
 
   Correlation 
Variable Mean SD A SN PBC I 
Attitude (A) 4.47 1.14 -    
Subjective norm (SN) 3.83 1.20 0.59 -   
Perceived behavioural control (PBC) 5.91 1.27 0.16 0.10 -  
Intention (I) 3.66 1.80 0.61 0.63 0.19 - 
Note. Mean scores are based on scales, with possible scores ranging from 1 to 7.  
All correlations were significant, p<.01, n=2285. 
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Table 5 
Behaviour intention regressions 
 
Behaviour Intention Independent Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Contributing extra to 
superannuation 
Attitude 0.30** 
(0.057) 
(n=*****) Subjective Norm 0.74** 
(0.075) 
 Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
0.71** 
(0.048) 
 
Change superannuation 
investment strategy 
Attitude 0.25** 
(0.043) 
(n=*****) Subjective Norm 0.91** 
(0.067) 
 Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
0.13** 
(0.024) 
Note. ** significant, p<.01. Unstandardised coefficient from regression of Intention on Attitude, 
Subjective Norm and Perceived Behavioural Control for each targeted behaviour. R2 values for 
contributions to extra to superannuation 0.76, 0.72 for changing superannuation investment strategy. 
 
 
Table 6 
Normative belief strength and motivation to comply with important referents to make 
extra super contributions 
 
 Belief Strength 
(n) 
Motivation to 
Comply (m) 
Correlation 
 nimi with 
Referent Mean SD Mean SD Intention 
The government 5.45 2.08 2.94 2.21 0.07 
Your superannuation fund 5.07 2.02 3.79 2.25 0.11 
Your financial advisor  5.02 1.91 4.75 2.08 0.22 
Your spouse/partner  4.06 2.02 5.23 193 0.35 
Your employer 3.12 1.89 2.50 1.81 0.06 
Note. Normative belief strength and motivation to comply scored from 1 (low) to 7. 
nimi = (Normative Belief Strength) x (Motivation to Comply) provides indirect measure of 
subjective norm.  
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Table 7 
Normative belief strength and motivation to comply with important referents to 
change super investment strategy 
 
 Belief Strength 
(n) 
Motivation to 
Comply (m) 
Correlation 
nimi with 
Referent M SD M SD Intention 
The government 3.90 2.21 2.95 2.28 0.14 
Your superannuation fund 4.01 2.25 3.79 2.09 0.16 
Your financial advisor  4.46 2.08 4.75 1.97 0.24 
Your spouse/partner  3.65 1.93 5.23 1.97 0.33 
Your employer 2.77 1.81 2.50 1.80 0.15 
Note. Normative belief strength and motivation to comply scored from 1 (low) to 7. 
nimi = (Normative Belief Strength) x (Motivation to Comply) provides indirect measure of 
subjective norm. 
 
 
